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INTRODUCTION 
The advent of the "new federalism" is widely acknowledged as altering, signifi-
cantly, intergovernmental relationships particularly in the arena of social services. The 
intent is, clearly, to decentralize the system, leaving state and local governments with 
wide discretionary powers to replace the ever dwindling role of federal government. 
Block grants have become the accepted fiscal strategy for decentralization. In consoli-
dating several categorical programs into a block with few directions for how the grant 
should be used, it is left to the states to decide what services will be provided, at what 
level, and to whom. 
Minnesota was an early entrant into the block grant movement. In a series of 
legislative acts beginning in 1973 and culminating in 1979 with the passage of the 
Minnesota Community Social Services Act, 1 the areas of corrections, health, and social 
services were combined into block grant allocations derived from fixed formulae and sent 
down from the state to county units of government. In Minnesota, with its historical 
legacy of local control, block grant funding is seen as a way of strengthening services at 
the local level. The assumption is that local government is best able to define local 
problems, set service priorities and allocate resources reflecting local needs. Several 
concepts undergird this assumption: the block grant, with its limited specifications, 
encourages flexibility and innovation; rational planning based on local needs assessments 
will provide efficiency; greater coordination and coherence of public, private and non-
profit delivery systems can be managed within a local context; and finally, a more 
significant role for advocacy and interest groups can be provided at the local level where 
easier access to local decision-makers is possible. 
This paper is directed chiefly toward this last assumption. What are the oppor-
tunities or limitations for influencing decisions on allocation issues at the local level? To 
explore this question, this study was undertaken to see how one long-:-standing advocacy 
group, Community Action Agencies, with a stated mission of concern for low-income 
constituencies, fared under the new arrangement of increased local control over social 
services and social programs. 
It comes as a surprise, even to many close observers of social program develop-
ments, that a hardy remnant of the 1960s' War on Poverty programs has survived in the 
form of Community Action Agencies or CAPs (Community Action Programs), as they are 
called in Minnesota. Hundreds of these entities continue to exist throughout rural and 
small town USA, providing a separate delivery system of programs and services designed 
to serve low-income constituencies. 
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Although recent reorganization has eliminated their parent agency, the federal 
Community Services Administration, the mission of CAPs remains substantially true to its 
historic roots. Funds are to be used for the stated purpose " ••• to ameliorate the causes of 
poverty in communities within the State ••• to provide a range of community action services 
and activities ••• to remove obstacles and solve problems which block the achievement of 
self-sufficiency; to make more effective use of other programs related to the purposes of 
this subtitle [i'he Community Services Block Grant Ac!] •112 
In Minnesota, Community Action Agencies had been recognized by state statutes in 
order to "help develop the full potential of each of its citizens so that they can live in 
decency and dignity and so that they can contribute to the strength of the state as a 
whole.113 They received tangible support in terms of supplementary state appropriations. 
Although three urban CAPs are part of the Minnesota system (Minneapolis Com-
munity Action Agency, Ramsey Action Programs, and the Duluth Community Action 
Program) we have chosen, in this paper, to concentrate on rural CAPs with the knowledge 
that these organizations could, potentially, play a pivotal role in advocacy and influence 
at the local level. Generally, in rural areas, there are few interest groups that can 
mediate between low-income constituencies and county authorities. Indeed, CAPs in rural 
areas may be the only organized groups that are representative of a broad range of low-
income interests. 
In the rural social milieu, where the inbalance between human service needs and 
resources exacerbate problems, CAPs, in the past have emerged, outside of public 
welfare, in an almost uncontested role as an entity with considerable resources for low-
income persons. 
In examining the role of rural CAPs and their interactions with local county 
governments empowered with block grants for social services, this paper will scrutinize 
some of the assumptions mentioned above and highlight both the opportunities and 
constraints of interest groups in a local milieu. Finally, the paper will make the case for 
the presence of a secondary social service delivery system in order to provide competitive 
tension to the monopoly of resource control exerted by county governments under a block 
grant system. 
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SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
In preparing this study of the role CAPs play in delivering social services to rural 
Minnesota, a series of semi-structured interviews were conducted with the twenty-three 
* directors of Minnesota's rural CAPs. The interviews were conducted, chiefly, by six 
graduate students from a class in community development at the School of Social Work, 
University of Minnesota. The interviews took place during spring quarter of 1981. 
Further interviews and exchanges were conducted with selected staff members of 
the State Office of Economic Opportunity, the Association of Minnesota Counties, and the 
Department of Public Welfare. Selected papers from the University of Minnesota's CSSA 
Research Project 4 were reviewed as well as previous studies on Minnesota CAPs. In 
addition, profiles on each CAP that had been prepared for the 1980 legislative session 
were examined. 
It should be noted that more than two-thirds of the interview respondents requested 
confidentiality. Therefore, the data have been aggregated without attribution to any 
individual CAP respondent. Only information which has been obtained from published or 
public sources has been identified by name. 
The interviews were conducted at a time when the organizational survival of CAPs 
was in question. 5 Day-to-day rumors and speculation abounded as Congress debated 
whether or not to "block" CAPs into the Social Services Block Grant. The political 
turbulence, at the time, could reasonably account for the cautious and constrained 
perspectives that pervaded some of the interviews and certainly explains the high number 
of requests for confidentiality. 
To set the stage for an examination of the interaction between CAPs and county 
governments, it may be instructive to sketch, briefly, some background on each 
organization and its special features. 
*In one instance an assigned deputy director was interviewed in lieu of the director. See 
Appendix 5 for the interview format. 
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THE HISTORIC CONTEXT 
BACKGROUND ON CAPs 
Community Action Agencies were fundamental to the strategies embraced by the 
War on Poverty, inaugurated in 1964 with the passage of the Economic Opportunity Act. 
Conceived and nurtured at a time when presidential advisors had identified political 
powerlessness as a chief attribute of poverty, Community Action Agencies were recom-
mended as the remedy. Launched in controversy, they have floated through a haze of 
conflicting interpretations over their mandates throughout their eighteen year history. 6 
Nevertheless, it is worth recalling the basic mission of Community Action Agencies 
as stated in the Economic Opportunity Act . 
•.• to stimulate a better focusing of all available local, State, private, and 
Federal resources upon the goal of enabling low-income families, and 
low-income individuals of all ages, in rural and urban areas, to attain the 
skills, knowledge, and motivations fnd secure the opportunities needed 
for them to become self-sufficient. 
The mandate is a sweeping one. "The Act thus gives the CAA a primary catalytic 
mission: to make the entire community more reponsive to the needs and interests of the 
poor •.• A CAA's effectiveness, therefore, is measured not only by the services which it 
directly provides but, more importantly, by the improvements and changes it achieves in 
the community's attitudes and practices toward the poor ••. " To carry out this mission 
effectively, plans and programs must be developed "with the maximum feasible participa-
tion" of the poor and in close partnership with local public officials and agencies. "No 
community can ever be fully responsive to the needs of the poor without the active 
participation and cooperation of its duly elected or appointed officials ••• This critical link 
between service delivery and improved community response distinguishs the CAA from 
other agendes •... in performing its role as an advocate of the poor the CAA must carefully 
choose the isues on which it takes stands and the tactics which it employs so as to 
maximize the chances of success ••• 118 
The realities of the intervening years have exposed the apparent contradictions in 
assigning to CAPs this "impossible" mission: the performance of roles in advocacy, 
service delivery, institution building, creating strategies for social change, while at the 
same time assuming the stance of master planners and coordinators of local resources for 
the poor. The stress laid on active participation and cooperation with elected-officials 
appears to have set the clear limits of this grandiose mission. A stream of critical 
literature has explored the nettlesome mix of advocacy and service goals for CAPs, 
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documenting the "taming" of its social change mandate through congressional action and 
regulations. Of significance, here, is that political pressures from locally-elected 
officials forced most of these constraints. 9 
While confrontation strategies, chiefly associated with urban CAPs during their 
early years, slid into general disrepute, it is clear that anxieties have persisted about 
CAPs' potential activism. Witness the stormy events of 1973-75 when former President 
Nixon attempted to dismantle CAPs along with other OEO programs.10 The questions 
raised during this period have been raised in subsequent appropriation crises, which 
continue to threaten the survival of CAPs. 
The issues were rooted in the ambiguities surrounding the relationship between 
CAPs and elected officials at the local level. It was generally conceded that the 
Community Action Agency, as a concept, was a prime example of the fiscal link between 
the federal government and a para-governmental agency existing largely independent of 
established governmental units at the local level. Suspicions persisted that the "feds" had 
created an agency solely to prod locally-elected officials to be more sensitive to the 
needs of the poor. Congressional hearings were replete with complaints that the federal 
involvement was, in fact, using CAPs to harrass local levels of government. It was 
asserted that this strategy for helping the poor obtain "what they had coming" was 
manifestly unfair, if not, dangerous. While a series of amendments were enacted to curb 
the autonomy of CAPs and tame their potential activism, nevertheless, the existence of 
CAPs continued to be challenged by local officials in every appropriation debate. 
However, CAPs managed to keep thei~ footing in the treacherous sands of shifting 
political ideologies both at federal and local levels, functioning as a useful bridge between 
the federal government and local communities for delivering certain human services that 
local governments could not be counted on to provide for low-income populations. Their 
enduring presence testifies to their usefulness as an alternative or complementary system 
for delivering social services. 
Special features of CAPs 
CAPs, especially in the rural areas, are now multi-purpose local institutions, 
receiving and managing a complex series of grants and contracts targeted for low-income 
constituencies. In the words of a recent congressional report, "··· The Community Action 
concept, although once contoversial, has proven to be an effective mechanism for delivery 
of services.... In many areas the local community action agency is the only viable 
organization that local residents interact with on a regular basis. The most identifiable 
community resource in many rural areas of the country is the local Community Action 
11 Agency." 
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Nationwide, a network of 897 Community Action Agencies exists in more than two-
thirds of the nation's counties, receiving and expending some 2 billion dollars from a 
variety of programs and contracts. 12 In Minnesota of twenty-six CAPs, twenty-three are 
rural.* Of eighty-seven counties, only six remain "uncapped,1113 and even in those six 
counties some services are received under contract from neighboring CAPs. The entire 
CAP network is a substantial part of the social service system in Minnesota (see Table 1). 
TABLE 1. MINNESOTA CAP INFORMATION, 1980+ 
(excluding urban CAPs: Ramsey, Minneapolis, and Duluth) 
Total number of employees 
Total number of low-income persons 
served, all programs 
Funding sources for CAP program 
Federal 
State 
Local 
Total budget for all CAPs 
Median percent of administrative costs 
for all programs delivered 
2,158 
187,237 
78% 
19% 
3% 
$91,040,863 
7.5 
+See Appendix 1 for funding sources of individual CAP 
programs and the counties within their jurisdiction. 
Source: Minnesota CAP Association, Inc., St. Paul. 
*In addition to the twenty-six CAPs in Minnesota, there is a separate group of CAPs 
associated with Indian tribal governments. They were not included in this analysis of the 
role of CAPs in social services delivery. 
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Rural CAPs are organized around multi-county jurisdictions. The board is generally 
composed of two county commissioners from each county, holding at least one-third of 
the board membership; low-income persons, holding another one-third; and representatives 
from community groups making up the final one-third. Dividing representation among the 
public, private, and low-income sectors emphasizes the ties of CAPs to the local 
community. This structure tends to offset the charge that CAPs represent the intrusive 
role of the "feds" in local affairs. 
Five basic programs operate under the community action concept: local initiatives; 
senior opportunities and services; community food and nutrition programs; energy 
conservation and winterization; and community economic development programs. Most 
rural CAPs also operate Headstart programs, senior citizen projects, and information and 
referral services. A small number of counties contract with CAPs to operate CETA and 
housing redevelopment programs. Projects which have community organization features 
are strikingly absent in this array of programs. 
CAPs in rural Minnesota are organized as private, non-profit corporations. They 
cannot, by law, be established in a community without the consent of the locally-elected 
officials and these officials may eliminate them, although this act would be subject to 
review and appeal. 
Two-thirds of Minnesota's CAP directors are "first generation," having been with 
their program since its inception. Of the twenty-six CAP directors in the state, twenty-
four are men. Most outreach coordinators, on the other hand, who live in a wide network 
throughout the small towns and farms of the. rural sector, are women. An Economic 
Opportunity Office in the Department of Economic Security has a general coordinating 
and advisory role to the twenty-six CAPs, the Migrant Community Action Agency, and the 
CAPs associated with Indian tribal governments. 
BACKGROUND ON COUNTY GOVERNMENT 
Across the nation, county governments, until recently, claimed little attention in 
public affairs. While the size of county budgets had grown tremendously, counties were 
perceived as administrative subdivisions of the state performing certain necessary state 
functions, but with little leeway for independent exercise of discretionary policy 
authority. Their interests were chiefly in roads and bridges, land use, public safety, 
courts, and tax and election administration. Beginning with the 1970s, however, 
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unplanned and often unperceived growth of county functions emerged. The advent of the 
"new federalism" with its slogan "the government closest to the people is the most 
responsive" awakens attention to this sleeping giant within our governmental structure. 
In Minnesota, county government has been relatively more important than in other 
parts of the country, especially in areas away from the large urban center. Minnesota is 
one of twenty states in the country that has a county-administered, state-supervised 
system of public welfare. Efforts to create multi-county units and to regionalize for both 
planning and program purposes have been sturdily resisted. Minnesota's respect for local 
government prepared the way for its early entry into the "block grant movement," 
preceding the national surge by several years. In 1973 community corrections, and in 1976 
community health were assigned to county jurisdiction with a state allocation calculated 
through a fixed formula. The block grant for social services was inaugurated in 1979 
under the Community Social Services Act. 
Just as the block grant concept has emerged nationally as a keystone to the 
administration's promise to reverse federal involvement in social programs, Minnesota 
intends to use the state's Community Social Services Act to reduce the role of the state in 
the social services arena. Minnesota's CSSA, by way of a complex allocation formula, 
delivers to the eighty.:.seven counties of the state a block of money consolidating funds for 
mental health, child welfare, Title XX, chemical dependency, and other streams of 
categorical funding. The 443 locally-elected county commissioners hold the purse strings. 
The model envisioned is one based on rational planning around local needs. It is assumed 
that it will provide greater coordination for public, private, and non-profit social service 
delivery systems; require a high degree of citizen participation; and allow for more 
flexibility and innovation in responding to local problems. 
With county commissioners emerging as "keepers of the corn bin," as one CAP 
director observed, this relatively obscure elected set of officials now claims attention 
from the constituencies concerned with social welfare. However, as observed by a staff 
member of the Association of Minnesota Counties, no comprehensive profile of 
demographic data exists for these elected officials. Five commissioners for each county* 
are elected for four-year terms. Beyond this statutorily-dictated circumstance, 
information about Minnesota's county commissioners is chiefly impressionistic and 
includes the following characterizations: they represent the old settlers of the region, 
have lengthy incumbencies, and reflect the rural values of self-sufficiency and a 
conservative point of view with regard to social programs. 
* Seven for the metropolitan counties: Hennepin, Ramsey, St. Louis, and Anoka. 
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Until a few years ago, county government was a male preserve. Only recently have 
twenty-eight women been elected, less than 7 percent of the total. Rural county 
commissioners are generally categorized as retired farmers, small businessmen, and older 
"family men." They play an extensive role in rural affairs with interlocking directorships 
on boards, committees, and advisory task forces. The fact that, in an unprecedented 
event, ninety incumbents were defeated in recent county elections attests to renewed 
interest in county politics. The new commissioners are generally observed to be younger, 
with higher education levels than previous incumbents, and more inclined to have business 
rather than farm interests. But observers contend that conservative points of view have 
b . . d 14 een mamtame . 
Inasmuch as county agencies are clearly in a transition period as they reorganize to 
deal with their new responsibilities in social services, only preliminary reports are 
available on the internal relationships between elected officials and county staffs. It is a 
mixed picture at this point. Some counties have active commissioners who relish the 
increased responsibilities that block grants allow. Others rely on paid executive staffs 
and are content to "rubber stamp" staff decisions. No significant patterns have, as yet, 
emerged. 
It is important to note that since CSSA, 30 percent of the counties have eliminated 
their welfare boards, entities which consisted of county commissioners and two appointed 
citizen members, one of whom had to be a woman. This has substantially reduced the 
number of women who serve at the county level in social welfare issues. 
BACKGROUND ON THE MINNESOTA COMMUNITY 
SOCIAL SER VICES ACT 
Understanding the political circumstances that created the Community Social 
Services Act in Minnesota in 1979 is indispensable to an analysis of the relationship 
between counties and CAPs. 15 
Expenditures for social services had tripled in Minnesota between 1962 and 1972. 
The figure doubled again by 1977. Simultaneously, there was a corresponding growth in 
the number of statutes and state departmental provisions regarding funding, 
administration, and delivery of services. 
Retrieving data from eighty-seven counties had always been something of an issue. 
The problem of retrieval, however, reached a dramatic impasse when the then House 
Speaker (now U.S. Congressman) Martin Sabo, attempted to secure a definitive accounting 
of social services expenditures for the 1977 legislative session. No definitive figures were 
forthcoming. Further, there was open dissatisfaction with the way appropriations for 
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social services were handled: piecemeal fashion according to the legislator's perception 
of a statewide need for the services. At the same time, well-organized interest and 
advocacy groups abounded in the state and most of them had become sophisticated in 
prowling the halls of the state legislature searching for ways to influence the political 
action for their specific programs. 
The lack of an understandable and accountable system was especially troublesome to 
Sabo and his legislative colleagues because large amounts of money appeared to be coming 
into the state from Washington and flowing down to the counties without a discernible 
audit trail. State departments distributed monies to local levels through various funding 
methods. It was difficult to determine what services were being provided and what the 
actual cost was. Further, the eighty-seven counties were widely diversified in resources, 
outlook, and population. Populations per county ranged fom 4,000 to 1,000,000. 
The stage was set for a sharp restructuring of social services funding. The 
inequitable distribution of funds to local governments and the "first come, first served" 
lobbying influences for categorical programs at the state house, reinforced the search for 
legislation that could rationalize what was commonly considered a fiscal muddle. 
It is interesting to note that Saba's thinking was shaped by his experience with the 
school aid formula, a ·statutory formula which provided an equalization focus based on the 
principle that no child should be deprived of a good educational experience because of 
geographical fate. "Why can't we do the same for social services?" To develop legislation 
, 
that would provide an equalization formula but leave to local units of government 
discretionary powers for the content and style of delivery for social services became the 
guiding principle behind CSSA. It was aptly expressed in a memorandum to Sabo from the 
House Research Department in 1976: 
My understanding of the underlying concept and purpose of the proposal is 1) 
to eliminate categorical state funding for separate client populations, 2) to 
simplify the appropriation process by eliminating the variety of grant-in-aid 
formulas in the present system, 3) to strengthen county government by 
transferring the planning, priority-setting and budgeting for social services 
from the state level to elected officials at the local level. The end result of 
such a system is to define (in the sense of "set limi\t to") the responsibility of 
state government in the provision of social services. 
Two clear consequences were expected from this effort. First, by providing a clear 
audit trail to the door of elected officials (county commissioners) for the expenditure of 
public funds, an important political principle could be asserted: public money expended 
for public purposes should be tied securely to elected officials. This would have the 
effect of making the system accountable and if locally-elected officials had to take the 
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political heat for decisions, at least it would be clear to voters where responsibility was 
lodged.* 
Secondly, by decentralizing the system, there would be a growing understanding of 
the nature of social services and their role in the lives of individuals, families and 
communities. It was observed that the impenetrable social service fiscal muddle and the 
hazy notions about social services functions contributed to the lack of public support. 
CSSA would not only educate elected officials, but by the statutorily-mandated citizen 
participation process, the public, as well, would begin to grasp the nature of these 
indispensable services and therefore be willing to pay for them. 
In May of 1979, the Minnesota legislature passed the Community Social Services Act 
and it became operational January 1, 1980. County governments now had major 
responsibility for planning, organizing and delivering a wide range of income maintenance 
and social service programs for low-income persons in their localities. The state agency, 
the Department of Public Welfare, was directed to reflect the legislative intent: to 
diminish its role. 
* For some observers the decentralization of accountability was attributed to a more 
self-serving motive: the longing of state legislators to create a political shield from 
the ever-increasing interest groups who were alleged to be clogging the halls of the 
legislature with their paid and unpaid lobbyists. 
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THE ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT 
DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES 
While CAPs and county governments are both delivery systems for social services 
and income maintenance programs for low-income persons, striking and significant 
differences are revealed in their organizational context. Examining missions and 
mandates, perceived constituencies, ideologies and goals through the eyes of CAP 
directors and county commissioners, one sees the organizational differences (Table 2). 
Ideology 
Goal 
Mandate 
Cons ti tutency 
TABLE 2. DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES 
CAP Directors 
Advocacy 
Extend the acquisition 
of resources 
Outreach 
Disadvantaged in the 
community 
County Commissioners 
Fiscal conservatism 
Keep the tax rate down 
Re-election 
Reduce spending 
The taxpayer 
Differences are also perceived in their intergovernmental relationships. CAPs are, 
in effect, fiscal agents for the federal government, receiving a smaller share of their 
resources from state government and only 3 percent from local government (see Table 3). 
On the other hand, county governments bear a heavy local cost for their programs despite 
intricate allocation formulae which reflect federal and state shares.* Overall, 53 percent 
of social service costs are borne by the counties. 
* See Appendix 2 for a county-by-county listing of funding sources for county social 
services, 1980. These figures may be compared with funding sources for CAP programs 
listed by county in Appendix 1. 
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TABLE 3. DIFFERING FUNDING SOURCES (in percents) 
Federal 
State 
Local 
CAPs 
78 
19 
3** 
*21 % represents CSSA funds. 
County 
23 
26* 
51 
* *2% represents cash funds, the remainder are "in-kind" 
funds. 
Both counties and CAPs strive to emphasize local control as their reputational 
badge. A somewhat hidden dimension to the competitive nature of the relationship is 
revealed in the public references to CAPs as "federally funded" agencies and then, the 
denial by CAP directors that they are "agents of the feds," a perjorative term which 
assails them from time to time in the local rural political arena. Several CAP directors 
were at pains to report that their boards and employees were all long-time local residents 
and that local small business enterprises are significant beneficiaries of the federal 
contracts for fuel assistance, food stamps, and housing rehabilitation programs. 
Further differences are noted in the knowledge and skill in dealing with intergovern-
mental affairs. CAP directors and their staffs have become expert at obtaining grants, 
skillful in negotiating contracts, and astute in their lobbying efforts at the state and 
congressional levels. County commissioners rely very heavily on their paid staffs for 
these activities and on their own, chiefly informal, networks. Their orientation is local. 
Both, however, have associations that provide coordination and lobbying functions. 
A significant distinction arises in the area of accountability. CAP directors have 
unusually wide latitude in controlling their resources and they are accountable to the 
public only indirectly through reports to state and federal administrative agencies. 
However, the election process forces accountability for commissioners at regular 
intervals with their local constituency. Moreover, the complexity of regulations narrows 
their control over resources. Presumably this will change when the widened discretionary 
powers associated with block grants increase the decision-making options for county 
commissioners. 
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Differences in programming distinguish CAPs from county services. The county 
supplies direct services to people in the areas of health, corrections, mental health, 
mental retardation, child welfare, and family services. Programs under Title XX, the 
chief social services funding stream, are mainly related to strengthening families. They 
include such services as marital counseling, direct service to adolescents, chemical 
dependency, and services to children in need of protection for neglect and abuse. CAP 
programs, on the other hand, are more involved with community initiatives for individuals 
and families where income insufficiency is the principal handicapping factor. Local 
people are encouraged to create and run groups that will help them help themselves. 
Thus, under local initiatives, planting vegetable gardens, learning to can food, and 
organizing clothing exchanges are typical projects. In addition CAPs have proved to be a 
useful vehicle for carrying out emergency programs that come up from time to time under 
special circumstances. Thus we find, for instance that fuel assistance to the poor is 
provided through CAPs and the government cheese give-away was conducted through 
CAPs. The constituencies served by county social services and CAPs, while they may 
differ in some respects, are, in fact, often indistinguishable. The recipients of CSSA and 
CAPs share a common trait: they are the poor i.n ici:-;:1.l_ -::ommunities. In sum, the county 
and CAPs, carry on different activities for the same constituency. 
Staffing patterns also reveal striking differences. CAPs are staffed, chiefly, by 
low-income persons, and in the historic legacy of the "War on Poverty" days, they are for 
the most part "indigenous" and non-professional. The outreach coordinators are 
principally women, and a great many have known the AFDC program as recipients. The 
median salary for outreach workers in Minnesota was $10,000 in 1981.17 They are not 
unionized. County government social service workers, however, tend generally to have 
some professional background. They work in bureaucratic settings within a civil service 
system. Increasingly, these staffs are joining unions. Pay scales are substantially above 
those in the CAP pattern. 
Finally, the style of delivering services is most frequently referred to as an essential 
difference between the two systems. "We're basically optimistic about people; CAPs are 
laid back; less bureaucratic than 'welfare'; we don't wear a shirt and tie; we don't call 
anybody a 'client"'. This observation of one CAP director was amplified by the others. 
Typically, a contrast was drawn with county systems where eligibility investigations 
reinforced the "shame" of seeking help, an attitude which CAP directors assert is widely 
held in rural areas. 
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A COMPARISON OF RESOURCES 
Comparing the financing of social services in Minnesota under the county govern-
ment and under programs administered by CAPs reveals substantial symmetry in the size 
of their resources.* Overall CAPs were funded with $91,018,363 in 1980 while the county 
programs received slightly more, $104,051,767. * * Of the eighty-five counties under 
consideration, more than half (fifty-three) had CAP programs that were funded with more 
than the county social service programs. In sixteen counties the CAP funding is twice or 
more that of the county, but, on the other hand, ten counties are funded with more than 
twice the funding given to their CAPs (see Figure 1). 
A perspective from which to judge the comparative expenditures is revealed in the 
data of the "distressed" counties (Table 4). These are counties which are so designated by 
the state. A special equalization grant is provided by the state in recognition of the fact 
that these local units of government suffer from the fiscal disparities of high need and a 
low taxable base. One notes with interest that in these counties the CAP funding, which 
is spent in the community, is substantial and that, in fact, for eight out of the eleven so-
called distressed counties, the CAP monies are greater than the county's monies, leading 
to a substantial contribution to the local economy. 
TABLE 4. "DISTRESSED" COUNTIES: A COMPARISON OF 
COUNTY AND CAP FUNDING FOR SOCIAL SERVICES - 1980 
County County CAPs 
Beltrami $1,299,973 $1,841,205 
Cass 1,234,755 1,547,057 
Clearwater 436,737 337,517 
Kanabec 394,910 630,523 
Koochiching 960,751 1,719,993 
Mahnomen 297,496 698,838 
Mille Lacs 1,116,390 712,496 
Morrison 987,698 1,397,651 
Pine 1,121,601 777,741 
Todd 911,810 1,384,945 
Wadena 463,485 1,148,158 
*Though CAPs are administered on a multi-county basis, each Minnesota CAP furnished 
data on their funding by county for the legislative hearings in 1981 (April 7, 1981). Thanks 
to this data supplied to us by the Minnesota CAP Association we were able to make the 
county-by-county comparisons presented in this section. 
**See Appendix 3 for a county-by-county comparison. 
FIGURE 1. A COMPARISON OF CAP AND COUNTY 
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FINDINGS OF THE SURVEY OF CAP DIRECTORS 
CURRENT RELATIONSHIPS 
CAPs operate in a multi-county framework.* The administration of programs in 
counties that are widely different in philosophy, organization, and resources stretches the 
"umbrella" concept of organization to its limit. Glimpses of this complex environment 
were revealed throughout the interviews. 
Sorting out details in the interview data reveals a complex and subtle picture rooted 
in a mix of formal and informal relationships. Sparring for territorial and resource 
advantage, the CAPs and counties show relationships that span the continuum from 
subdued hostilities to "live and let live" arrangements. Clouding the entire contest, 
however, is the fact that these two entities generally know very little about each other's 
operation. A 197 5 study revealed that 40 percent of the county commissioners observed 
that they knew very little about CAPs. 18 On the other hand, our CAP informants also 
displayed a limited knowledge of county social services. We found the most intensive 
exchange, except for a handful of counties, to occur between the direct workers of both 
agencies. 
While local history, personalities, and clashing philosophies appear to determine the 
quality of relationships between CAP and county, a basic issue is the role of CAPs in 
outreach. For some county commissioners, guarding the public purse means limiting 
people's access to services and resources. This position is antithetical to the mission of 
CAPs. Illustratively, food stamps became a major issue for some county commissioners. 
One CAP director was sued by a county for his policy of vigorous outreach in putting new 
people on food stamps. Another CAP agency was warned not to participate in outreach 
lest the counties become, "a haven for every hippie in the state." In other counties the 
eligibility guidelines for fuel assistance were a bone of contention with individual 
commissioners. 
There were examples, however, of reciprocal relationships between counties and 
CAPs based on mutual concerns. In one CAP jurisdiction, fuel assistance eligibility was 
determined by the counties, but CAP delivered the service. For the CAP, this 
arrangement allowed it to divorce itself from the "gate-keeping" function but maintain its 
reputation as the source of resources. For the counties, it meant savings of both money 
and time for their overburdened staffs. Such reciprocal relationships reveal that a "modus 
vivendi" has been worked out over the years, especially with those CAP directors who, as 
self-described "good old boys," have been around for more than a decade: "We don't rock 
their boats and they don't rock ours." 
* See Appendix 4 for a listing of Minnesota counties and their CAP affiliations. 
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However, when CAP directors were asked a question relating to their organizational 
* survival, (Should CAPs be "blocked" into the social services block grant?), their deep _ 
apprehensions were revealed. Generally, they believed that they would not be permitted 
to retain the separate identities of CAPs if they were included in block grants and that 
autonomy would be sharply curtailed. They largely agreed that county commissioners 
would look hungrily at the resources which CAP agencies have accumulated. Vivid images 
were invoked. "A shoot-out at the Title XX corral" was predicted. "A mongoose and a 
cobra circling each other," captured the scene for one observer. It is noted that in 1980 
when counties could designate who would provide fuel assistance programs, about a dozen 
counties decided to remove these programs from CAPs and take them into their own 
domain. 
Competitive and uneasy tension, generally, marked the formal relationships between 
CAPs and counties. 
CAPs IN THE CSSA PLANNING PROCESS 
The chief issue in a block grant system is how and by whom decisions about resource 
allocations are to be made. The Minnesota Community Social Service Act is based on the 
notion of a collectivity of interest groups that will engage in a rational planning process 
arriving at a consensus. Conversely, the stated mission of CAP agencies is to mobilize 
resources "to bring about greater institutional sensitivities" to the needs and interests of 
19 the poor. 
When CAP directors were asked about their knowledge of the CSSA plans for their 
counties a startling isolation from the CSSA planning process was revealed. CAPs were 
unaware, generally, of even the basic features of the plans. Only two CAP directors knew 
the funding formula in the CSSA. Only seventeen county plans out of a possible eighty-
three, roughly 20 percent, had been examined by the CAPs in the counties under their 
jurisdiction. 
Of those CAP directors who had examined the county plans, comments ranged from 
"good," "better than most," "reasonable," "the best that could be done," to negative 
comments. In one instance, it was revealed that the CSSA plan had been developed on a 
contract with an outside agency, violating the spirit of local participation. This had been 
a target of criticism in the community. In another case the disparity between the plan 
and its implementation was observed: "Plans list services that never come to be; they list 
WIC (a nutrition program for pregnant women) but they don't have it; they say what the 
* At the time of the interviews this appeared to be a real possibility. 
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services will be, but they don't say anything about the quality." In other instances the 
routine, superficial features of the plan were noted: "Just a laundry list; regurgitating 
what they have always done." A candid comment from one CAP director, "can't figure it 
out ... too much of a puzzle," exposes the indifference to the central planning document for 
social services in the counties, the CSSA plan. 
In sum, the interactive process, theoretically at the heart of CSSA planning, appears 
to be minimal in its engagement with CAPs. 
The legislation enacting the Community Social Services Act requires a model of 
planning that includes citizen involvement as well as a thorough needs assessment.20 
Although CAPs pride themselves on extensive knowledge of the needs of low-income 
populations, their participation in CSSA plans was limited. Only 10 percent were invited, 
formally, to participate in formulating the plans. In these instances, CAPs were used to 
provide demographic information on the low-income population; to conduct some needs 
assessment activities; and to sit on advisory panels. Advocacy on behalf of family 
planning, day activity centers, and services for the mentally retarded appeared as specific 
contributions. 
While it was generally stated that informal exchanges, especially between the staffs 
of CAPs and counties, were pervasive, the overall conclusion was that the knowledge, 
insights, and data that CAPs had accumulated were not used and did not carry influence in 
either the needs assessments or citizen participation processes for the county. Inasmuch 
as CAPs are required to do their own needs assessments and have available up-to-date 
profiles on local conditions from their extensive network of outreach coordinators, this 
isolation of one system from another is striking. 
Generally, the CAP directors did not take these elements in the planning process 
seriously, pointing out that the needs assessments as set out in the CSSA plans were, on 
the whole, limited, routine, and shallow. Further, that discrepancies between stated 
needs and actual programs available were prevalent throughout the counties. 
Except for a small minority (three out of twenty-three responses) most CAP 
directors believed that county commissioners were, on the whole, cynical about the needs 
assessment as a useful planning step. In a sympathetic exchange between one county 
commissioner and one CAP director, "Don't tell us what we need, tell us how to find 
money," there is revealed, a basic understanding amongst some CAPs and counties that in 
times of declining budgets, needs assessments may be irrelevant. In the six counties 
where a basic conflict existed between the CAP director and the county commissioners, 
statements were made on the futility of engaging in needs assessment activities: 
"showing what people need doesn't necessarily mean they are prepared to listen." 
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Citizen participation hearings were also, generally, described as routine and trivial. 
In a few instances CAP directors alleged that information on when the hearings would 
occur was withheld or the hearings were set up in obscure parts of the counties. At least 
one CAP director, however, was sympathetic with the plight of local government where 
"the buck stops." It was his position that elected officials in his region participated with 
good intentions to honor the citizen participation plan, but that they were helpless to 
respond, give the financial constraints of county budgets. 
While counties used a variety of procedures to fulfill the statutory requirement of 
involving citizens in the planning process, for whatever _reasons, notably missing was the 
presence of CAPs. 
CAPs' INFLUENCE ON COUNTY DECISION-MAKING 
Inasmuch as budget decisions on programs and services are made throughout the 
year at public monthly meetings of the county commissioners, we asked CAP directors 
whether or not they attended these meetings. Only three CAP directors reported 
attendance at county meetings on a fairly regular basis. For those who rarely attended, 
the following comm·ents were typical: "wouldn't be welcome"; "might think we were 
spying"; "don't see the point"; "we are perceived as looking for ways to spend tax 
money ••• the commissioners don't take advice from anybody"; "no sense in riling them up." 
The Association of Minnesota Counties' study of 197 5 revealed that, to a great 
extent, CAPs and county government coexisted in local communities in virtual isolation 
from each other.21 The small and unspectacular role that we found CAPs to play both in 
formulating county social service plans and in continuing to influence decisions made in 
monthly board meetings generally affirms that observation. 
We asked CAP directors how they perceived the decision-making process at the 
level of county commissioners. No pattern seemed to emerge from their comments. 
Indeed, the striking observation that can be made is that wide variations are perceived in 
the decision-making processes among county officials. 
The relationship between CAP directors and county commissioners appears to be 
most influenced by the length of tenure enjoyed by the CAP directors. In the rural 
context, where old settlers with their strong, informal networks among the "locals" are 
highly prized, one notes with interest that two-thirds of CAP directors fit the description 
of "good ol' boys," a phrase used by one informant to convey the notion of men who were 
well known in. their communities, operated in informal ways to do their business, were 
widely connected to established organizations and very much at ease, through long 
associations, with the leadership of their communities. Generally, these CAP directors 
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had a relationship of easy, or sometimes uneasy, coexistence with county government. 
The other one-third of the directors, however, had lived in the community for less than 
ten years, were not members of conventional organizations, and tended, on the whole, to 
be relatively withdrawn from the traditional leadership of the communities. Here, a 
contentious relationship was most typical. 
As was previously noted, the interviews took place at a time of intense speculation 
as to whether or not the counties would absorb both the resources and the role of CAP 
agencies. Indeed, a staff member of the Association of Minnesota Counties observed that 
at the time there was a strong position growing in that organization that "CAPs have our 
money and we need it." 
On the question of whether or not CAPs could play a monitoring role with regard to 
CSSA, the respondents generally dismissed this notion as impossible, politically. "It would 
be considered harrassment" was typical of the comments. 
An air of intimidation pervaded the responses to questions on the capacity of CAPs 
to influence decisions of county commissioners. The vulnerability of CAPs, at the time, 
conveyed the typically held notion that "low profile" was the preferred survival strategy. 
Only a few directors felt they would and should maintain a strong advocacy position on 
certain issues, such as outreach for food stamps. Heroic images were invoked, such as 
"going down in flames." A more typical response was one give by a CAP director on an 
attempt to sponsor a controversial family planning program. "I tried to get a program 
going but I just couldn't ••• ! didn't want to bite the hand that might have to feed me ••• " 
THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT FOR LOW-INCOME CONSTITUENCIES 
Several questions in the interviews related to attitudes toward the needs of low-
income and underserved people in the CAP jurisdictions. One question asked: Which of 
these statements would you support? 
1) "Advocacy groups and service providers are concerned about the future in the 
fear that client groups for whom they speak will be hurt by county board 
decisions that may change the pattern of services and may reduce services to 
certain client groups. They think it leads to too much control in the hands of 
locally-elected officials." 
2) "Specific needs and targeting of resources can best be determined at the local 
level by elected officials rather than on a statewide basis by the legislature in 
the state bureaucracy." 
The frequency and constancy of comments in support of the first statement was striking. 
In the open-ended comments that followed this question there was a general view that 
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while some counties could be characterized as "very conservative," "conservative," and 
"middle of the road," only two could be called "liberal" in terms of understanding the 
needs of low-income people and fully accepting the responsibility of local government to 
respond within the limits of budget restrictions. 
The unequivocal perception was that personal destinies could not be trusted to local 
government, especially for those people who belonged to certain categories of poor. 
AFDC clients were perceived as being especially disfavored. "There is a reservoir of 
compassion only for certain groups," was the way one CAP director put it. Most 
frequently mentioned as "deserving poor" were the disabled and mentally retarded. While 
senior citizens were regarded as "worthy" in most counties, one director observed, "Even 
seniors are thought to be too greedy." 
Local political forces were judged to be the most influential factor in making 
decisions at the county level. "What county commissioner is likely to give priority to the 
poor in the face of middle income demands and vested interest?" This observation of one CAP 
director captures the sentiments of many responses to questions about the local political 
environment vis-a-vis attitudes toward the poor. Another CAP director noted that a 
group of private well-:--to-do property owners, in a dispute with an Indian tribal council over 
hunting and fishing rights, had actually requested funding for legal assistance from the 
county commissioner, from Title XX funds. 
The impact of local politics is particularly noted in the funding of controversial 
programs such as family planning. 22 While transportation, the needs of the chronically 
mentally ill, alcohol and chemical dependency, and unemployment were consistently 
mentioned by CAP directors as the problems having the highest priorities for attention by 
local government, adolescent pregnancy dominated their responses as being the most 
serious problem. (Two-thirds of the directors identified it this way). Yet, statewide, the 
smallest expenditure for all services was tied to family planning ($185,000 out of almost 
$150 million dollars for all social service expenditures in 1980). 23 
In one county, it was pointed out, where the out-of-wedlock birth rate was close to 
the highest in the state, family planning did not appear on the priority listing of the 
county's CSSA plan. In another county, the commissioners, though no financial obligation 
would have been incurred, refused to vote for a non-profit agency that sought a grant 
from the state fund to create family planning services. When an attempt was made to 
encourage the local hospital to apply, the hospital officials refused lest they jeopardize 
the support they needed from the commissioners for their building plans. 24 
Sensitivity to political pressures exerted on county commissioners was noted by a 
few CAP directors in the following way: a double voting pattern on troublesome issues. 
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"They vote to support the programs at CAP board meetings, when they're being observed 
by low-income representatives, but reverse their vote when the issue comes before the 
county board meetings." 
Aside from political factors, inexperience and personal values were most often 
mentioned as determinants in shaping the decisions that would be made under CSSA. One 
CAP director's comment amplifies a general concern over the personal values of county 
commissioners. "CAPs run fuel assistance so conservative commissioners cannot 
influence the program. County commissioners know what they are going to do for roads 
and bridges in the next five years. But they haven't a clue about what to do with social 
services. Some of them don't even understand what they are and others will not want to 
learn. We are far away in this county from having anything that resembles a 
comprehensive look at what should be done for poor people." 
These perceptions, however, are too broad for easy generalizations. 
One cannot categorize all county commissioners as "hard-nosed managers" pro-
tecting the public purse from the undeserving poor. Nor can one lump all CAP directors 
as "ardent advocates" of the poor. Therein lies the dilemma in sorting out the political 
context at the local level. Objective data on the values, political pressures, and attitudes 
of Minnesota's 443 county commissioners have yet to be acquired. 
CAPs AND ADVOCACY FOR THE POOR 
The ability to organize and advise policy makers of the service needs of the groups 
which they represent is assumed as a necess<:1rY component of a block grant system. To 
what extent, then, did CAPs advocate on behalf of their low-income constituency? 
Throughout their controversial history CAPs have had the permissible bounds of 
their advocacy role defined and redefined. 25 The ambiguities of the advocacy role for 
CAPs are vividly revealed in the wide range of responses we received to questions on their 
advocacy function. 
All rural CAP informants agreed that providing services was their prime activity. 
All but one CAP director agreed that an additional role could be described as 
"representative of underserved groups in the community." However, there was sharp 
division on how this role was to be translated into action. Only four directors mentioned 
"advocacy" as an activity they assume, and even they assumed it only in selected counties. 
Almost half the directors stated that they would not give "political" advice to county 
commissioners, and while most indicated that they exchanged observations with county 
commissioners, this too, was qualified by indicating that in some counties they would not 
do so, even at the level of informal exchange. 
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Staying out of trouble was the chief theme of those who affirmed with various 
degrees of intensity, their withdraw! from advocacy efforts. "No way. There's an order 
out to workers that they are not to be involved in any political activity. That is how 
CAPs got into trouble in the past. No politics. I stay away. I never give advice, but I 
listen ••• " 
However, the need for advocacy on behalf of low-income people was almost 
uniformly asserted. "County commissioners let their personal views on poverty interfere 
with their duties and decisions. They made it, 'Why can't everybody?' is their point of 
view." But the futility of advocacy and indeed the danger to organizational survival was 
pervasive in the directors' observations. "The commissioners don't take advice from 
anybody. This is not the time to be contentious and combative. A low profile is what we 
need." A substantial minority of CAP directors asserted that organizational survival 
dictated the denial of an advocacy role for CAPs. 
A minority point of view was presented by a few directors with some vigor. 
"Advocacy is the basic function of our agency. It was and still is our original mission. 
Agencies that have compromised have survived. In our case, we may not because we 
won't knuckle under •. I've been called on the carpet many times for my views, but that's 
O.K." These directors were particularly concerned about the forthcoming amendments to 
the CSSA which would strike away the concept of mandated services. "If mandated 
services are abolished, there will be a lot of folks hurt. Certain groups are not loved out 
here. This community is very anti-American Indian." Indeed, one person noted that it was 
not unlike the southern prejudice toward blacks before 1965. AFDC clients were another 
group described as disfavored in certain counties. 
It is perhaps no coincidence that of the CAP directors reporting a basic conflict 
with their county commissioners, all but two observed that they belonged to few if any of 
the community organizations common to rural areas. 
When asked, "When people are in trouble in this area, to whom would they turn if 
they have been turned down by the county?" there was an overwhelming response that 
CAPs would be first and legal services second. Occasional responses mentioned clergy 
and the sheriff. On one county, the sheriff kept heaters on hand for emergencies.) The 
staffs of county agencies were mentioned from time to time as extremely important 
advocates for underserved groups. 
CAP directors have enormous discretionary authority when it comes to the role that their 
agencies will play in the community. CAP boards rarely challenge the director. The 
director's ideology, therefore is critical to the role that CAP will play in the local 
community. If advocacy efforts can be described as publicizing a social condition 
neglected by established agencies or stimulating a ;'community of concern" (activities that 
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are still articulated in instruction manuals), these are absent from the agenda of most 
CAPs in Minnesota. 
Community organization, in the sense of developing a vehicle "owned" and directed 
by low-income persons, is not on the agenda of any CAPs in rural Minnesota. A recent 
effort of CAPs in that direction, however, is worth noting. Three CAPs initiated a sub-
contract with COACT (Community Organizations Acting Together) a grass roots "people's 
movement" spreading throughout the rural counties in Minnesota. This was described as 
an important development in revitalizing the advocacy role for CAPs. 26 By mid-1982, 
however, all rural sub-contracts had been terminated because of the grass-roots 
organizing which is a feature of COACT activities. The "cease and desist" messages were 
strong and decisive. 
CAPs' historic "social change" mission has been converted to a pattern of "service" 
strategies. CAPs are now attacked from both sides: by county officials for their 
potential advocacy roles and by community activists for their "lack of backbone." 
In 1973, a grass roots organization in Rice County accused the CAP agency of 
defaulting in its primary mission of advocacy by excluding the poor from participation. 
The fact that the issue was initiated by outreach workers of the CAP was an irony not lost 
on the local press. In the charges and countercharges, it was clear that the advocacy role 
had become so dormant that a grass roots organization had arisen to challenge the CAP. 27 
On the other hand, the congressman from the Sixth District recently initiated an 
investigation of the CAP in his district, alleging that it was improper for letters to have 
been sent out on CAP letterhead urging supporters to write to their elected representa-
tives on behalf of CAPs. Both the FBI and the U.S. Justice Department were brought in 
to investigate.28 Clearly, anxiety about the potential advocacy role of CAPs exists in 
some places. 
Limitations on advocacy seem to have been clearly established: advocacy, perhaps, 
for selected programs and individuals, but not for organizing the poor. Organizational 
survival has for the most part "tamed" the advocacy role. 
Yet the exceptions to this general observation are worth recording. One CAP 
director, expressing a minority point of view, asserted that CAPs should and could 
advocate for low-income persons. This director felt that CAPs' absorption in their own 
survival was an over-reaction. He observed that elected officials require a shield from 
politically unpopular but necessary programs and disfavored constitutencies. "We're going 
to survive, we insulate them from political heat." 
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AN INTERPRETATION OF THE FINDINGS 
To what extent can a block grant system that concentrates power in the hands of 
locally-elected officials provide an opportunity for a countervailing force to mediate on 
behalf of client groups? 
The Minnesota Community Social Services Act, a model block grant system, 
assumed that as the state and federal role was withdrawn, local government would change 
from simply implementing and delivering services into establishing social policies as well. 
This would mean making the critical decisions about how funds would be allocated, 
establishing levels, standards, and the modes of delivery for a variety of social services 
and programs; and evaluating the implications of allocation decisions. 
Renewing a historic belief that local government is best able to respond appro-
priately to the needs of its citizens, a rational planning system was incorporated in the 
CSSA legislation with a number of assumptions. First, a planning model based on needs 
assessment, citizen participation, and access of advocacy groups to elected officials was 
instituted to reflect the variations in needs of local communities. Further, it was 
intended that a high degree of coordination could take place among public, private, and 
non-profit agencies; and that, at last rid of the straight-jacket of federal and state 
regulatory processes, flexibility and innovation would emerge--that the presence of 
advocacy and interest groups would ensure equity. Indeed, any irrational tendency 
inherent in improvised decision-making could be curbed by an alert citizenry. Here the 
assumption was that the citizen is the best watchdog of public business. 
The examination of how CAPs operate alongside of the block grant system is 
instructive. CAPs as well as being a delivery system of community services can also be 
described as "advocacy agencies." They have a mandate to represent interests for a 
specific constituency, in this case, low-income persons. They have access to resources 
specifically linked to this constituency and they have an organizational presence within a 
f . f h . 29 system o services or t at constituency. 
CAPs advocacy role, however, has historically and up to the present become an area 
of conflict in local communities. Here the "competitive tension" between the two 
systems emerges. On the one hand, there are CAPs with their extensive network of 
outreach coordinators actively uncovering persons in need while, on the other hand, the 
counties, as "keepers of the corn bin," are struggling to confine the numbers of persons 
consuming their dwindling resources. Underlying this tension is a conflict over ideology, 
mission, and constituency. The adaptation of CAP directors to this tension appears to 
range from purposeful isolation to an uneasy exchange with the counties that border on 
being adversarial. Many CAP directors maintain an uneasy exchange with the counties. 
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Complexities and contradictions appear to be characteristic of the interactions 
between CAP directors and county commissioners. In the view of the CAP directors 
surveyed, decision-making at the local level seems to be shaped by a mixture of three 
distinct, but inter-related factors.30 
1) Personal Ideology. Decisions of elected county officials appear to be made often 
more on the basis of the comparable worth of various client groups· than on the 
effectiveness of programs. Further, personal experiences often shape decisions. 
The ideology of CAP directors is equally important in shaping their decisions and 
how they interact with county commissioners. 
2) Local History. Decisions are also shaped by historic antagonisms revealing local 
passions and prejudices against certain groups. Women on AFDC, Indians, and 
unemployed single adults are often deemed to be morally culpable and therefore 
undeserving. CAP directors were well aware of these historic prejudices. In some 
counties locally-elected officals ask for names in order to review caseloads so that 
they could personally determine a recipient's eligibility. 
3) Political Context. A hierarchy of tastes exists among county commissioners. 
Economic and political interests often influence commissioners' decisions. In one 
case a commissioner had an economic interest in a facility for the chemically 
dependent. One CAP director reported that in another instance, a commissioner 
compared costs between pre-school programs for developmentally disabled 
youngsters and programs that provided hot lunches for the elderly and voted for the 
latter, noting the political power of the elderly citizens in his county.31 
Another factor that influences decision-making is the recommendations of 
professional staffs. In some counties it appears that there is a rising conflict between 
professional staff and elected officials. In others, the county commissioners, unfamiliar 
with social service systems and their intent, rely very heavily on professional staff. 
Systematic data on the role of professional staff in decision-making has not as yet been 
collected. Some elected officials relish the take-over permitted under CSSA, others are 
content to "rubber stamp." The differential factors have not, as yet, been ascertained. 
While no clear pattern of decision-making emerged, the political nature of the 
environment was persistently noted in our interviews with CAP directors. Observations 
such as, "They will go a long way to accommodate to the powerful and influential 
members in the community," were recurrent. 
Another frequent observation was: "In rural communities, interactions are personal, 
it is the only game in town." The factor of personal relationships and their impact on 
decision-making appears to be powerful. In this instance, it was noted that CAPs, by their 
clear identification with low-income people are perceived as having meager political 
power in rural communities. 
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Two items were mentioned by CAP directors as over-riding concerns for county 
commissioners: avoiding controversy and keeping the advocacy role of CAPs within 
permissible bounds. The following strategies were identified as common among the 
elected officials. 
1) Double voting patterns; voting for programs for low-income persons within a 
CAP board meeting, but reversing the vote at the county board, where the 
final vote must be taken. 
2) Keeping controversial items off the agendas. 
3) Settling controversies in off-the-record meetings. 
4) Avoiding public debate on issues of controversy by not publicizing the time and 
place of meetings. 
Perhaps the repetitive references to these strategies reveal more than other data, 
the lack of trust between many CAP directors and county commissioners, and the uneasy 
relationship between the two. 
WHY CAPS HA VE PERSISTED 
The anxious interplay between CAP and county has been compounded by the 
uncertainties of recent federal budgetary actions. The federal Community Services 
Agency, which administered CAPs, has been eliminated. An office in the Department of 
Health and Human Services will administer the dwindling activities of the nation's CAPs. 
32 -Federal funds for CAPs are expected to be reduced by 70 to 85 percent in 1983. If 
CAPs_ are to survive, new funding will have to come from state government and local 
governments. 
Minnesota's experience is worth recording. Despite the precarious existence of 
CAPs nationwide, they have enjoyed strong legislative support in Minnesota. Since 1973 
the legislature has appropriated funds for CAPs each year. In the 1982 legislative session, 
amendments to the 1981 Act revealed the durable acceptance of CAPs as an indispensable 
part of the state's resources for low-income people.33 While rumors persisted that the 
counties would oppose legislation to maintain CAPs, when the amendments were proposed 
the counties offered no opposition. Indeed, in pre-hearing negotiations, there was a 
reluctant realization that CAPs had important uses that counties could not reproduce. 
The amendments as they were approved encourage closer coordination between 
CAPs and counties: CAPs are to be informed of new outreach programs for low-income 
persons, CAPs are to be consulted on needs assessments, and CAPs are encouraged to 
monitor county social programs. Counties are prevented from vetoing any CAP program. 
Federal dollars consolidated within a block grant must be maintained for anti-poverty 
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purposes and cannot be absorbed for other purposes. On ,the other hand, specifying 
specific components of CAP services (such as employment, education, family planning and 
alcoholism treatment) was repealed so as to assure counties that duplication of services 
would be avoided. 
The Governor, in signing the bill, commented that the "competitive tension" 
provided by CAPs was important for the state. CAPs received by these amendments a 
firm endorsement as an indispensable component of the social services' and programs' 
delivery system. 
Unquestionably, the economic role of CAPs in local communities is one of their 
features that is valued. Over an eighteen year period they have become organizations 
with resources that sometimes overshadow those of the county for human services. 
Money, personnel, and a large client group form a power base which provides, as one CAP 
director put it, "the bargaining chip" when organizational survival is threatened. Indeed, 
the economic power of CAPs, especially in "distressed" counties, is formidable. In some 
of these counties, CAPs rank as the fourth or fifth largest employer. Their skill and 
sophistication in securing federal grants is illustrated by the Arrowhead CAP in the 
northern part of the state with a budget for 1980 of $14,264,406.34 "No other single 
agency in the rural areas has such a major involvement with the federal government," is a 
common observation, confirmed by the annual reports of the state Office of Economic 
Opportunity. CAPs' economic contribution is not lost on local enterprises. "It is a major 
flow of money in this region and banks know it," commented one CAP director. 
Further, they are a convenient conduit for soft money programs that must get out 
quickly and efficiently to the low-income sector. The fuel assistance and weatherization 
program illustrates the usefulness of a CAP agency with its well-developed outreach 
networks that stretch across the towns, villages, and farms of rural Minnesota. 
CAP outreach coordinators, low-income persons themselves, are distinguished by 
their special brand of "needs assessment." Based on informal, neighborly knowledge of 
how people are trying to survive, they are truly "grass roots" in their approach of door 
knocking, visiting, and exchanging information and referral in literally hundreds of 
communities in the state. Where the values in a rural context are antithetical to 
economic dependency and the culture attaches shame to seeking help, the distinctive style 
and outreach of CAPs make them an essential alternative delivery system for poor people. 
CAPs were also mentioned as a political convenience for county government. "When 
you have a controversial program, or where it is a soft money program that's going to be 
here today and gone tomorrow, it's better to have the CAPs do it and catch the flak when 
the programs disappear." The political value of having an agency that insulates elected 
officials from the heat of controversial services is quietly acknowledged by astute 
members of local government. 
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A controversial "strength" of CAPs is uncovered in the observation that CAPs can 
deliver services with efficiency and economy. Stressing their flexibility, because of their 
private non-profit status, the organization is identified as one that is not weighted down 
with the paraphernalia of civil service systems and rigid staffing patterns. CAP directors 
also mention the low administrative costs associated with their program delivery. More 
than one observer pointed out to us, however, the irony of this assertion. The question 
was raised as to whether or not an organization mandated to improve the economic status 
of poor people, could itself, justify paying low wages to its own staff and discouraging 
. . . 35 
umomza t10n. 
A less noted but important contribution that CAPs make derives from their capacity 
to coordinate the participation of community groups and volunteers. The CAP presence, 
for example, has been identified as a significant contribution in making nutrition programs 
for the elderly and other senior center pro·grams available and accessible.36 
In total, CAPs emerge as a useful and important presence in rural Minnesota. They 
provide economic resources, a useful outreach network, and a political shield for 
"unpopular" programs. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The social program arena is now one in which fiercely contending needy groups vie 
for favorable attention within a block grant system. Political pressure is focused on 
locally-elected county officials. The protection of categorical ·grants is diminished. 
Local prejudices attached to "deserving" and "undeserving" groups endanger the principle 
of equity. Disfavored groups are especially vulnerable given the monopoly role assigned 
to elected county com missioners under the CSSA. 
The importance of a countervailing force is essential in subduing the concentration 
of power with the county boards and constraining the personal vagaries of elected 
officials. 
The assumption that the planning processes for allocating resources under a local 
block grant system are open has been called into question. One study notes the decline in 
the number of hearings.37 Others have pointed out the routine and shallow nature of 
needs assessments.38 How to safeguard the rights of minorities in environments which 
may be inhospitable as a result of the "passions and prejudices" of local history is an 
essential question. Can CAPs assume the role of monitor and advocate? 
The strengths of CAPs, their flexibility as social program delivery systems, their 
outreach capabilities, and their skills in negotiating inter-governmental programs, have 
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already been noted. They have, however, rarely sat at the negotiating table when CSSA 
plans were shaped. And they have not emerged in a monitoring role to safeguard the 
interests of disfavored low-income persons. 
A central issue, therefore, emerges. To what extent can CAPs be freed from the 
intimidating environment which places them at risk, since they serve at the pleasure of 
county officials? Realistically, there is very little room for CAPs to move beyond the 
permissible bounds of the advocacy activities which have already been set: to continue to 
do outreach, to present information and insights on needs assessments, and to encourage 
citizen particpation for their low-income constituents. Even these activities have, at 
times, been circumscribed by various "cease and desist" messages and limited by the 
perceptions of CAP directors who have chosen "isolation" as a survival strategy. 
The monitoring role for CAPs needs to be strengthened. Attendance at board 
meetings, participation in advisory committees, and observation of appeals procedures 
need to be safeguarded from reprisals. In this connection an evaluation of the 
effectiveness of CAP boards is in order and accountability measures for CAP directors 
should be instituted. Indefinite tenure, which appears to be the general practice, should 
be examined. 
A block grant system requires checks and balances. While the role of CAPs in 
providing an advocacy organization centered on organizing low-income constituents to 
confront county commissioners is not a viable concept, they can contribute information, 
outreach, and a point of view that will have fundamental value for the mix of local 
political decision making. 
The isolation of CAPs from the elected county structures is a loss to the state. 
Active exchanges between these two entities will enlarge the understanding of the needs 
of low-income populations--populations that are sparsely represented in the rural milieu 
where decisions are made. 
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APPENDIX 1 
FUNDING SOURCES FOR RURAL CAPS 
-
1980 
Local 
In-Kind 
Goods/ 
County Federal State Cash Services Total 
Anoka County Community 
Action Program, Inc. $3,050,000 $ 600,000 $ 30,000 $ 40,000 $3,720,000 
Anoka 2,500,000 425,000 30,000 40,000 2,995,000 
Washington* 550,000 175,000 0 0 725,000 
Arrowhead Economic 
Opportunity Agency 9,996,492 3,663,589 472,621 131,690 14,264,392 
Aitkin* 541,663 116,659 43,776 0 702,098 
Carlton* 541,663 70,514 9,685 0 621,862 
Cook 707,340 216,040 33,252 6,584 963,216 
Itasca* 902,772 352,541 81,229 0 1,336,542 
Koochiching* 541,663 171,236 33,252 0 746,151 
Lake 1,038,710 385,995 33,252 19,753 1,477,710 
St. Louis 5,722,681 2,350,604 238,175 105,353 8,416,813 
Bi-County Community 
Action Council, Inc. 2,606,883 736,276 42,488 0 3,385,647 
Beltrami 1,462,122 347', 595 31,488 0 1,841,205 
Cass 1,144,761 388,681 11,000 0 1,544,442 
Clay-Wilkin Opportunity 
Council, Inc. 1,596,670 410,059 164,826 0 2,171,555 
Clay 1,070,473 216,700 146,917 0 1,434,090 
Wilkin 526,197 193,359 17,909 0 737,465 
Goodhue-Rice-Wabasha 
Citizens Action Council $3,419,450 $ 755,134 0 $ 86,262 $4,260,846 
Dakota* 0 61,000 0 0 61,000 
Steele* 92,130 22,000 0 0 114,130 
Goodhue 1,204,515 284,615 0 29,347 1,518,477 
Rice 1,060,912 135,447 0 33,657 1,230,016 
Dodge* 116,467 20,000 0 0 136,467 
Wabasha 945,426 232,072 0 23,258 1,200,756 
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Local 
In-Kind 
Goods/ 
County Federal State Cash Services Total 
Inter-County Community 
Council, Inc. 2,634,837 451,047 600 0 3,086,484 
Clearwater 214,109 123,258 150 0 337,517 
Pennington 799,760 81,748 150 0 881,658 
East Polk 1,020,267 177,643 150 0 1,198,060 
Red Lake 600,701 68,398 150 0 669,249 
Koochiching-Itasca 
Action Council, Inc. 2,555,636 498,400 186,401 87,700 3,328,137 
Itasca 1,788,945 348,880 159,456 57,074 2,354,355 
Koochiching 766,691 149,520 26,945 30,626 973,782 
Lakes and Pines Community 
Action Council, Inc. 3,842,419 899,519 0 86,893 4,828,831 
Aitkin 502,576 101,646 0 4,600 608,822 
Carlton 511,754 112,991 0 9,289 634,034 
Chisago 379,944 114,571 0 0 494,515 
Isanti 457,367 99,657 0 3,220 560,244 
Kanabec 479,617 112,286 0 38,620 630,523 
Mille Lacs 559,454 130,698 0 22,344 712,496 
Pine 609,816 159,105 0 8,820 777,741 
Washington* 341,891 68,565 0 0 410,456 
Mahube Community 
Council, Inc. 3,169,850 934,502 122,842 0 4,227,194 
Becker 1,775,116 497,852 62,538 0 2,335,506 
Hubbard 887,558 274,023 31,269 0 1,192,850 
Mahnomen 507,176 162,627 29,035 0 698,838 
Minnesota Valley 
Action Council, Inc. 5,373,088 1,358,312 71,850 0 6,803,250 
Blue Earth 899,692 109,662 8,000 0 1,017,354 
Brown 603,322 57,937 9,400 0 670,659 
Faribault 659,654 224,361 2,400 0 886,415 
Lesueur 573,973 65,222 13,600 0 652,795 
Martin 586,794 265,705 2,400 0 854,899 
Nicollet 592,737 150,001 11,700 0 754,438 
Sibley 641,549 169,042 7,950 0 818,541 
Waseca 357,136 119,801 14,000 0 490,937 
Watonwan 458,231 196,581 2,400 0 657,212 
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Local 
In-Kind 
Goods/ 
County Federal State Cash Services Total 
Northwest Community 
Action, Inc. 594,894 672,484 0 55,922 1,323,300 
Kittson 142,775 161,396 0 13,421 317,592 
Lake of the Woods 86,259 97,510 0 8,109 191,878 
East Marshall 86,260 97,511 0 8,109 191,880 
Roseau 279,600 316,067 0 26,283 621,950 
Otter Tail-Wadena Community 
Action Council, Inc. 2,528,895 34li600 0 0 2,870,495 
Otter Tail 1,517,337 205,000 0 0 1,722,337 
Wadena 1,011;558 136,600 0 0 1,148,158 
Prairie Five Community 
Action Council, Inc. 1,676,187 255,068 2,800 29,750 1,963,805 
Big Stone 373,365 33,583 0 1,200 408,148 
Chippewa 379,393 54,026 0 26,800 460,219 
Lac Qui Par le 321,143 106,850 2,800 0 430,793 
Swift 301,143 33,583 0 1,750 336,476 
Yellow Medicine 301,143 27,026 0 0 328,169 
Region 6E Community 
Action Agency, Inc. 3,483,668 8~5, 311 41,467 0 4,390,446 
Kandiyohi 1,108,283 213,841 27,167 0 1,349,291 
McLeod 729,638 230,828 3,200 0 963,666 
Meeker 835,784 208,218 8,000 0 1,052,002 
Renville 809,963 212,424 3,100 0 1,025,487 
Scott-Carver Economic 
Council, Inc. 2,568,699 341,850 40,804 21,000 2,972,353 
Anoka* 334,965 0 0 0 334,965 
Carver 949,683 211,702 21,152 10,500 1,193,037 
Dakota* 407,568 26,293 0 0 433,861 
Hennepin* 22,500 0 0 0 22,500 
Scott 649,576 103,855 19,652 10,500 783,583 
Washington 204,407 0 0 0 204,407 
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Local 
In-Kind 
Goods/ 
County Federal State Cash Services Total 
SEMAC, Inc. 4,066,305 780,762 142,192 179,200 5,168,459 
Dodge 301,330 101,715 21,200 9,000 433,245 
Fillmore 625,073 81,875 25,700 52,000 784,648 
Freeborn* 441,678 37,700 10,000 9,200 498,578 
Goodhue* 46,500 0 7,752 10,000 64,252 
Houston 517,231 147,451 20,000 21,000 705,682 
Mower* 467,357 128,606 10,000 2,000 607,963 
Olmsted* 365,918 36,841 0 0 402,759 
Rice* 46,500 0 3,540 8,000 58,040 
Steele 325,311 53,600 10,000 16,000 404,911 
Wabasha* 49,000 0 4,000 8,000 61,000 
Winona 880,407 192,974 30,000 44,000 1,147,381 
Southwestern Minnesota 
Opportunity Council, Inc. 2,004,077 469,243 40,000 50,200 2,563,520 
Murray 474,738 108,696 6,200 0 589,634 
Nobles 743,068 168,567 27,600 44,000 983,235 
Pipestone 557,301 126,426 6,200 0 689,927 
Rock 228,970 65,554 0 6,200 300,724 
Tri-County Action 
Programs, Inc. 4,527,137 611,466 18,900 0 5,157,503 
Benton 614,319 78,919 3,900 0 697,138 
Sherburne 630,207 88,097 0 0 718,304 
Stearns 3,282,611 444,450 15,000 0 3,742,061 
Tri-County Community 
Action Program, Inc. 3,783,930 369,105 16,821 0 4,169,856 
Cass* 0 0 2,615 0 2,615 
Crow Wing 1,261,310 123,035 300 0 1,384,645 
Morrison 1,261,310 123,035 13,306 0 1,397,651 
Todd* 1,261,310 123,035 600 0 1,384,945 
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Local 
In-Kind 
Goods/ 
County Federal State Cash Services Total 
Tri-Valley Opportunity 
Council, Inc. 3,289,109 394,356 183,347 185,687 4,052,499 
Chippewa* 109,411 0 0 0 109,411 
Clay* 138,868 0 0 0 138,868 
Kittson* 64,297 18,713 9,908 9,092 102,010 
Marshall 766,963 124,318 20,178 46,703 958,162 
Norman 831,861 94,085 27,158 30,152 983,256 
Pennington* 39,646 7,705 44,281 16,589 108,221 
Red Lake* 12,613 7,705 14,661 11,200 46,179 
Renville* 109,411 0 0 0 109,411 
Roseau* 30,632 18,713 8,958 4,088 62,391 
Steele* 124,660 0 0 0 124,660 
Traverse* 33,665 0 0 0 33,665 
Wilkin* 29,457 0 0 0 29,457 
West Central Minnesota 
Communities Action, Inc. 1,790,680 405,125 8,965 4,990 2,209,760 
Douglas 693,012 33,523 3,526 3,380 733,441 
Grant 316,541 58,291 1,221 0 376,053 
Pope 368,412 135,154 1,840 1,250 506,656 
Stevens 248,871 103,000 1,355 360 353,586 
Traverse 163,844 75,157 1,023 0 240,024 
Western Community 
Action, Inc. 2,397,503 876,909 21,830 0 3,296,242 
Cottonwood 313,433 108,812 0 0 422,245 
Jackson 300,179 82,251 0 0 382,430 
Lincoln 376,787 151,896 0 0 528,683 
Lyon 823,285 251,299 10,915 0 1,085,499 
Murray* 16,511 22,160 0 0 38,671 
Nobles* 16,511 26,560 0 0 43,071 
Pipestone* 20,701 15,880 0 0 36,581 
Redwood 521,841 205,171 10,915 0 737,927 
Rock* 8,255 12,880 0 0 21,135 
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Local 
In-Kind 
Goods/ 
County Federal State Cash Services Total 
Wright County 
Community Action, Inc. 300,152 521,137 5,000 0 826,289 
Wright 300,152 521,137 5,000 0 826,289 
TOTALS 71,256,561 17,211,254 1,613,754 959,294 91,040,863 
*These counties are outside of the jurisdiction of the CAP but receive some services under contract. 
Note that one contract for Hennepin County is included under the Scott-Carver Economic Council, Inc. 
Source: These figures are derived from the Minnesota CAP Association, Inc., Griggs-Midway Building, 
Suite S-281, St. Paul, Minnesota 55104. 
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APPENDIX 2 
FUNDING SOURCES FOR RURAL COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES - 1980 
State 
Additional 
CSSA State 
County Federal Grant Funding Local* Total 
Aitkin $ 194,174 $ 174,776 $ 6,240 $ 280,720 $ 655,910 
Anoka 1,128,182 703,937 264,148 3,134,669 5,230,936 
Becker 330,767 257,143 19,197 413,593 1,020,700 
Beltrami 490,345 327,267 67,362 414,999 1,299,973 
Benton 169,405 175,897 22,022 323,682 691,006 
Big Stone 84, 125 70,126 16,916 184,499 355,666 
Blue Earth 459,495 483,188 232,431 937,299 2,112,413 
Brown 203,753 167,692 113,916 345,000 830,361 
Carlton 502,374 373,365 54,529 607,511 1,537,779 
Carver 244,841 286,215 82,548 690,116 1,303,720 
,, 
Cass 335,531 284,537 78,287 536,400 1,234,755 
Chippewa 155,713 148,530 39,572 481,634 825,449 
Chisago 179,727 197,778 4,566 817,332 1,199,403 
Clay 326,206 356,549 43,838 531,985 1,258,578 
Clearwater 172,774 130,789 6,174 127,000 436,737 
Cook 46,772 46,264 22,747 199,376 315,159 
Cottonwood 116,463 133,033 47,771 346,453 643,720 
Crow Wing 496,300 358,036 29,598 416,214 1,300,148 
Dakota 1,072,605 1,137,548 508,568 5,422,329 8,141,050 
Dodge 96,025 117,099 53,141 171,677 437,942 
Douglas 244, 137 207,190 8,466 294,773 754,566 
Faribault (see Martin) 
Fillmore 168,513 159,481 2,642 160,000 490,636 
Freeborn 318,584 332,264 106,948 760,821 1,518,617 
Goodhue 270,439 287,026 96,386 460,400 1,114,251 
Grant 62,698 65,503 1,738 87,300 217,239 
Houston 129,970 93,969 32,305 186,694 442,938 
Hubbard 172,869 107,854 40,522 198,975 520,220 
Isanti 170,107 172,220 33,227 500,088 875,642 
Itasca 568,433 434,695 60,866 1,659,900 2,723,894 
Jackson 119,641 123,845 11,206 447,000 701,692 
Kanabec 140,035 121,793 15,838 117,244 394,910 
Kandiyohi 320,398 258,489 67,584 588,000 1,234,471 
Kittson 69,474 67,615 1,515 100,000 238,604 
Koochiching 237,245 229,704 14,999 478,803 960,751 
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State 
Additional 
CSSA State 
County Federal Grant Funding Local Total 
Lac qui Par le 78,620 80,890 11,634 91,000 262,144 
Lake 107,614 132,530 859 393,334 634,337 
Lake of the Woods 23,970 37,712 3,900 88,841 154,423 
Le Sueur 189,523 200,251 36,856 270,419 697,049 
Lincoln (region 8N) See Lyon 
Lyon** 413,158 331,564 42,760 583,428 1,370,910 
Mahnomen 75,949 70,294 16,063 135,190 297,496 
Marshall 106,227 116,524 6,861 182,000 411,612 
Martin*** 217,022 537,717 491,754 930,402 2,176,895 
McLeod 215,559 239,899 40,985 477,210 973,653 
Meeker 147,883 142,188 12,897 200,000 502,968 
Mille Lacs 205,601 189,373 16,416 705,000 1,116,390 
Morrison 308,171 297,045 55,623 326,859 987,698 
Mower 424,449 369,559 159,894 1,266,918 2,220,820 
Murray See Lyon 
Nicollet 165,159 150,518 24,979 382,301 722,957 
Nobles 249,058 164,857 62,895 457,571 934,381 
Norman 84,821 94,484 9,413 140,000 328,718 
Olmsted 786,260 673,375 355,248 986,602 2,801,485 
Otter Tail 433,318 380,372 3,339 406,900 1,223,929 
Pennington 149,551 156,743 29,775 156,743 492,812 
Pine 270,485 214,662 23,410 613,044 1,121,601 
Pipestone 103,485 110,860 16,139 209,000 439,484 
Polk 372,310 364,826 90,637 405,704 1,233,477 
Pope 87,729 97,626 8,011 229,246 422,612 
Red Lake 50,168 49,401 7,058 49,000 155,627 
Redwood 183,580 183,497 6,705 322,000 695,782 
Renville 158,187 154,590 13,528 507,598 833,903 
Rice 334,175 342,368 70,767 681,576 1,428,886 
Rock 65,528 74,747 34,598 154,540 329,413 
Roseau 107,764 113,405 33,003 69,000 323,172 
St. Louis 3,868,544 3,306,874 0 9,034,676 16,210,094 
Scott 155,564 343,190 365,523 1,407,291 2,271,568 
Sherburne 222,590 183,560 39,803 1,070,621 1,516,574 
Sibley 101,496 81,589 24,004 197,439 404,528 
Stearns 738,242 724,195 134,022 630,000 2,226,459 
Steele 189,565 200,200 78,530 258,954 727,249 
Stevens 93,122 94,622 11,239 100,000 298,983 
Swift 135,418 111,705 36,611 218,436 502,170 
Todd 292,038 214,159 65,613 340,000 911,810 
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State 
Additional 
CSSA State 
County Federal Grant Funding Local Total 
Traverse 61,484 51,587 2,252 120,000 235,323 
Wabasha 141,198 99,232 59,636 201,000 501,066 
Wadena 173,488 148,618 0 141,379 463,485 
Waseca 125,924 102,870 27,635 246,125 502,554 
Washington 794,375 677,043 257,567 3,014,022 4,743,007 
Watonwan See Martin 
Wilkin 75,822 67,423 14,562 153,487 311,294 
Winona 370,807 214,162 144,646 612,219 1,341,834 
Wright 445,707 357,448 143,260 1,017,261 1,963,676 
Yellow Medicine 128,586 133,342 41,853 301,842 605,623 
Totals 24,027,414 21,775,113 5,340,576 52,908,664 104,051,767 
* Raised by County Levy Tax Source: This data is derived from county budgets submitted to the 
Department of Public Welfare for calendar year 1980. 
* * Combines Lincoln (Region 8N), Lyon and Murray counties. 
***Combines Faribault, Martin and Watonwan counties. 
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APPENDIX 3 
A COUNTY COMPARISON: TOT AL FUNDS FOR RURAL 
SOCIAL SERVICES UNDER COUNTY PROGRAMS AND CAPS - 1980 
CAPs County 
County Funds Funds 
Aitkin $1,310,920 $ 655,910 
Anoka 3,329,965 5,230,936 
Becker 2,335,506 1,020,700 
Beltrami 1,841,205 1,299,973 
Benton 697,138 691,006 
Big Stone 408,148 355,666 
Blue Earth 1,017,354 2,112,413 
Brown 670,659 830,361 
Carlton 1,255,896 1,537,779 
Carver 1,193,037 1,303,720 
Cass 1,547,057 1,234,755 
Chippewa 569,630 825,449 
Chisago 494,515 1,199,403 
Clay 1,572,958 1,258,578 
Clearwater 337,517 436,737 
Cook 963,216 315,159 
Cottonwood 422,245 643,720 
Crow Wing 1,384,645 1,300,148 
Dakota 494,861 8,141,050 
Dodge 569,712 437,942 
Douglas 733,441 754,566 
Faribault 886,415 (See Martin) 
Fillmore 784,648 490,636 
Freeborn 498,578 1,518,617 
Goodhue 1,582,729 1,114,251 
Grant 376,053 217,239 
Houston 705,682 442,938 
Hubbard 1,192,850 520,220 
Isanti 560,244 875,642 
Itasca 3,690,897 2,723,894 
Jackson 382,430 701,692 
Kanabec 630,523 394,910 
Kandiyohi 1,349,291 1,234,471 
Kittson 419,602 238,604 
Koochiching 1,719,933 960,751 
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CAPs County 
County Funds Funds 
Lac qui Par le 430,793 262,144 
Lake 1,477,710 634,337 
Lake of the Woods 191,878 154,423 
Le Sueur 652,795 697,049 
Lincoln (region 8N) 528,683 (see Lyon) 
Lyon 1,085,499 1,370,910* 
Mahnomen 698,838 297,496 
Marshall 1,150,042 411,612 
Martin 854,899 2, 176,895** 
McLeod 963,666 973,653 
Meeker 1,052,002 502,968 
Mille Lacs 712,496 1,116,390 
Morrison 1,397,651 987,698 
Mower 607,963 2,220,820 
Murray 628,305 (see Lyon) 
Nicollet 754,438 722,957 
Nobles 1,026,306 934,381 
Norman 983,256 328,718 
Olmsted 402,759 2,801,485 
Otter Tail 1,722,337 1,223,929 
Pennington 989,879 492,812 
Pine 777,741 1,121,601 
Pipestone 726,508 439,484 
Polk 2,444,868 1,233,477 
Pope 506,656 422,612 
Red Lake 715,428 155,627 
Redwood 737,927 695,782 
Renville 1,134,898 833,903 
Rice 1,288,056 1,428,886 
Rock 321,859 329,413 
Roseau 684,341 323,172 
St. Louis 8,416,813 16,210,094 
Scott 783,583 2,271,568 
Sherburne 718,304 1,516,574 
Sibley 818,541 404,528 
Stearns 3,742,061 2,226,459 
Steele 643,701 727,249 
Stevens 353,586 298,983 
Swift 336,476 502,170 
Todd 1,384,945 911,810 
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CAPs County 
County Funds Funds 
Traverse 273,689 235,323 
Wabasha 1,261,756 501,066 
Wadena 1,148,158 463,485 
Waseca 490,937 502,554 
Washington 1,339,863 4,743,007 
Watonwan 657,212 (See Martin) 
Wilkin 766,922 311,294 
Winona 1,147,381 1,341,834 
Wright 826,289 1,963,676 
Yellow Medicine 328,169 605,623 
Totals 91,018,363 104,051,767 
* Combines Lincoln (Region 8N), Lyon and Murray 
counties. 
** Combines Faribault, Martin, and Watonwan counties. 
Sources: The CAPs figures are derived from the Min-
nesota CAP Association, Inc., Griggs-Midway Building, 
Suite S-281, St. Paul, MN 55104, (612) 645-4159. 
The CSSA figures are derived from county budgets sub-
mitted to the Department of Public Welfare for calendar 
year 1980. 
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County 
Aitkin 
Anoka 
Becker 
Beltrami 
Benton 
Big Stone 
Blue Earth 
Brown 
Carlton 
Carver 
Cass 
Chippewa 
Chisago 
Clay 
Clearwater 
Cook 
Cottonwood 
Crow Wing 
Dakota 
Dodge 
Douglas 
Faribault 
Freeborn 
Fillmore 
Goodhue 
Grant 
APPENDIX 4 
COUNTIES AND THEIR CAP AFFILIATIONS 
Agency 
Lakes & Pines Community Action Council, Inc. 
Anoka County Community Action Program, Inc. 
Mahube Community Council, Inc. 
Bi-County Community Action Council, Inc. 
Tri-County Action Programs, Inc. (St. Cloud) 
Prairie Five Community Action Council, Inc. 
Minnesota Valley Action Council, Inc. 
Minnesota Valley Action Council, Inc. 
Lakes & Pines Community Action Council, Inc. 
Scott-Carver Economic Council, Inc. 
Bi-County Community Action Council, Inc. 
Prairie Five Community Action Council, Inc. 
Lakes & Pines Community Action Council, Inc. 
Clay-Wilkin Opportunity Council, Inc. 
Inter-County Community Council, Inc. 
Arrowhead Economic Opportunity Agency 
Western Community Action, Inc. (WESCAP) 
Tri-County Community Action Pergram, Inc. (Little Falls) 
Uncapped 
SEMCAC, Inc. 
West Central Minnesota Communities Action, Inc. 
Minnesota Valley Action Council, Inc. 
Uncapped 
SEMCAC, Inc. 
Goodhue-Rice-Wabasha Citizens Action Council, Inc. 
West Central Minnesota Communities Action, Inc. 
Hennepin Uncapped 
Hennepin Minneapolis Community Action Agency, Inc. 
(City of Minneapolis) 
Houston 
Hubbard 
Isanti 
SEMCAC, Inc. 
Mahube Community Council, Inc. 
Lakes & Pines Community Action Council, Inc. 
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Itasca 
Jackson 
Kanabec 
Kandiyohi 
Koochiching 
Kittson 
Lac Qui Par le 
Lake 
Lake of the Woods 
Le Sueur 
Lincoln 
Lyon 
McLeod 
Mahnomen 
Marshall (east) 
Marshall (west) 
Martin 
Meeker 
Mille Lacs 
Morrison 
Mower 
Murray 
Nicollet 
Nobles 
Norman 
Olmsted 
Otter Tail 
Pennington 
Pine 
Pipestone 
Polk (east) 
Polk (west) 
Pope 
Ramsey 
Red Lake 
Redwood 
Koochiching-Itasca Action Council, Inc. 
Western Community Action, Inc. (WESCAP) 
Lakes & Pines Community Action Council, Inc. 
Region 6E Community Action Agency, Inc. 
Koochiching-Itasca Action Council, Inc. 
Northwest Community Action, Inc. 
Prairie Five Community Action Council, Inc. 
Arrowhead Economic Opportunity Agency 
Northwest Community Action, Inc. 
Minnesota Valley Action Council, Inc. 
Western Community Action, Inc. (WESCAP) 
Western Community Action, Inc. (WESCAP) 
Region 6E Community Action Agency, Inc. 
Mahube Community Council, Inc. 
Northwest Community Action, Inc. 
Tri-Valley Opportunity Council, Inc. 
Minnesota Valley Action Council, Inc. 
Region 6E Community Action Agency, Inc. 
Lakes & Pines Community Action Council, Inc. 
Tri-County Community Action Program, Inc. (Little Falls) 
Uncapped 
Southwestern Minnesota Opportunity Council, Inc. 
Minnesota Valley Action Council, Inc. 
Southwestern Minnesota Opportunity Council, Inc. 
Tri-Valley Opportunity Council, Inc. 
Uncapped 
Otter Tail-Wadena Community Action Council, Inc. 
Inter-County Community Council, Inc. 
Lakes & Pines Community Action Council, Inc. 
Southwestern Minnesota Opportunity Council, Inc. 
Inter-County Community Council, Inc. 
Tri-Valley Opportunity Council, Inc. 
West Central Minnesota Communities Action, Inc. 
Ramsey Action Programs, Inc. 
Inter-County Community Council, Inc. 
Western Community Action, Inc. (WESCAP) 
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Renville Region 6E Community Action Agency, Inc. 
Rice Goodhue-Rice-Wabasha Citizens Action Council, Inc. 
Rock Southwestern Minnesota Opportunity Council, Inc. 
Roseau Northwest Community Action, Inc. 
St. Louis Arrowhead Economic Opportunity Agency 
St. Louis Duluth Community Action Program, Inc. 
(City of Duluth) 
Scott Scott-Carver Economic Council, Inc. 
Sherburne Tri-County Action Programs, Inc. (St. Cloud) 
Sibley Minnesota Valley Action Council, Inc. 
Stearns Tri-County Action Programs, Inc. (St. Cloud) 
Steele SEMCAC, Inc. 
Stevens West Central Minnesota Communities Action, Inc. 
Swift Prairie Five Community Action Council, Inc. 
Todd Tri-County Community Action Program, Inc. (Little Falls) 
Traverse West Central Minnesota Communities Action, Inc. 
Wabasha Goodhue-Rice-Wabasha Citizens Action Council, Inc. 
Wadena Otter Tail-Wadena Community Action Council, Inc. 
Waseca Minnesota Valley Action Council, Inc. 
Washington Uncapped 
Watonwan Minnesota Valley Action Council, Inc. 
Wilkin Clay-Wilkin Opportunity Council, Inc. 
Winona SEMCAC, Inc. 
Wright Wright County Community Action, Inc. 
Yellow Medicine Prairie Five Community Action Council, Inc. 
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APPENDIX 5 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR MINNESOTA CAP DIRECTORS 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE INTER VIEWERS 
Begin the interview with a statement such as: We are interested in finding out to 
what extent groups or agencies in regions around the state interact with the County 
Welfare Boards or Community Service Agencies. (Substitute the name or names of the 
county social service agencies.) This particular set of interviews is concerned with the 
Community Action Agencies of the state. 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
Responses will be kept confid~ntial if you wish. The information will be folded into 
aggregate summaries and the responses will remain an anonymous observation. However, 
if confidentiality is not important to your interests, please let me know. 
Information to be kept confidential? Yes No 
INTERVIEW 
I. I would like to ask a few questions about your Community Action Agency. 
1. What counties does your Community Action Agent cover? 
2. Who is on the staff of your Community Action Agency? Job titles? 
3. How big is 'your advisory committee? 
4. What groups are represented on it? 
5. Do the county commissioners sit on the advisory committee? Is every county 
represented on this committee? 
6. How many? 
7. Do the executive directors of any of the county welfare agencies sit on the 
advisory committee? 
8. Do any of the staff members of the Community Social Service or Welfare 
Agency sit on the advisory committee? 
9. What programs does your Community Action Agency undertake? 
a) fuel assistance 
b) foster grandparents 
c) weatherization 
d) family planning 
e) outreach services 
f) other 
10. Do you have local initiative money? If so, what programs have been initiated 
from this pool of money? 
11. What is the size of your organization at present? 
a) total number of members 
b) total number of staff members 
c) total number of clerical staff 
12. What is the average attendance at your advisory meetings? 
a) less than half of the board members 
b) more than half of the board members 
13. To what extent do you or your staff interact with: 
a) the churches in the area 
b) the school systems 
c) other 
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14. Which of the following activities do you think your group now performs? 
a) gives advice to county commissioners 
b) gives political advice to the elected officials from this region 
c) provides services to this area which are needed 
d) other (please specify) 
II. The following questions will relate to perceptions about the region: 
1. I would like to ask you some questions about the problems or issues that you 
perceive in this particular region. These are some common problems around 
the state. Could you tell me which of the following are significant in this 
region? 
a) adolescent pregnancy 
b) chemical dependency 
c) battered women 
d) mentally ill 
e) mentally retarded 
f) physically handicapped 
g) home-health care to the elderly 
h) nursing home care for the elderly 
i) unemployment 
j) problems around migrant families 
k) problems with families and children 
in Indian families 
l) family violence 
m) child care 
n) family planning 
o) not enough housing for low and 
moderate income families 
p) insufficient recreation facilities 
for adolescents 
q) inadequate transportation 
r) poor educational systems 
Moderate Low 
2. Of all the problems mentioned above, could you pick the top three which are 
serious problems, three which have very little interest in this region? 
3. When people are in trouble in your area to whom would they turn if they have 
been turned down by the County Welfare Board? 
a) Legal Aid 
b) the minister or parish priest 
c) the local high school principal 
d) the sheriff 
e) other 
4. How would you characterize the attitudes, generally, of people in this area 
toward those who might need public assistance? 
a) liberal 
b) conservative 
c) very conservative 
d) middle-of-the-road 
5. County boards may choose to contract with some agencies to provide services. 
Does the Community Action Agency have any contracts with the county 
boards in their region? 
a) alcohol and drug abuse 
b) child care 
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c) services to the elderly 
d) other 
e) none 
6. Within the past three months, have you referred any families or individuals to 
the County Welfare Board? If so, 
a) how many 
b) in what situations 
7. In a final question about this region, would you say these statements are true 
or false? 
a) low-income people in this region lack awareness of services that are 
available to them. 
b) low-income people have little or nothing to say about things that affect 
their day-to-day lives. 
III. THE CSSA PLAN 
As you probably know, Minnesota now has a block grant system for funding social 
services. The basic principle of the Community Social Services Act is that state funding 
now goes by law to elected county boards who have responsibility for providing a range of 
social services. They are responsible for funding a broad array of programs such as 
Community Services to the mentally ill, the mentally retarded, the chemically dependent, 
child care and so on. 
This act shifts the responsibility for specific program funding decisions from the 
state level to county boards. 
1. Do you know what the funding formula is used as a basis for giving money to 
each of the counties in this state? (NOTE TO THE INTERVIEWER: This is 
based on the county income maintenance caseload, general population, and 
poulation over the age of 65. The county must match the state funds with the 
property tax levy.) 
2. Have you seen the Community Social Services plan from the counties in your 
region? Yes __ No __ 
3. If yes, did you have any reaction to the plan? 
4. Because organizations differ very much in the way they invite other people to 
assist them in making their decisions, we would be interested in knowing to 
what extent you think the community County Welfare Boards involve other 
agencies in helping them make their decisions. 
a) have they actively consulted your organization? 
b) do you actively feel you can have input into their decisions? 
c) how comfortable do you feel in making known the needs of groups that 
you serve to the County Welfare Board? 
d) did you attend a public hearing to discuss the CSSA plan? 
e) did you participate in any way in helping to formulate the plan--if so, in 
what way? 
f) does the fact that you cut across several counties affect the way in 
which you deal with County Welfare agencies? 
5. The following statements have been made about the Community Social 
Services Act: 
a) "Advocacy groups and service providers are concerned about the future 
in fear that client groups for whom they speak will be hurt by county 
board decisions that may change the pattern of services and may reduce 
services to certain client groups. They think it leads to too much control 
in the hands of locally-elected officials." 
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b) Others support the following statement: "Specific needs and targeting of 
resources can best :.,c ,:;':::!~rrr.ined at the local level by elected officials 
rather than on a statewide basis by the legislature in the state 
· bureaucracy." 
1) Which of these statements would you support? 
2) Comments. 
IV. INTERACTIONS WITH THE COUNTY WELFARE BOARD 
l. Do you attend meetings of the County Welfare Board? 
a) frequently 
b) occasionally 
c) never 
2. Do you ever meet informally (or even formally) with 
a) county commissioners 
b) the executive director 
c) staff members of the County Welfare agencies 
1) regularly 
2) occasionally 
3) never 
3. Are you involved with any of the advisory committees of the County Welfare 
Board? 
4. Are any county commissioners involved in your advisory committee? 
5. How would you describe the relationship between the community action 
agency and the County Welfare Board in your region? 
a) in basic conflict 
b) cooperative 
c) mixed 
d) very little contact 
e) other 
6. Would you say that the County Welfare Boards understand the needs of low-
income people in this region? Do they respond effectively? 
V. Finally, we have a few factual questions_ about yourself: 
l. How long have you held this position? 
2. Do you have other forms of income other than your job? 
3. What community do you live in within this region? 
4. What associations do you have with other community groups? 
5. How long have you lived here? 
6. Is there anything you would like to add about the region? Is there anything you 
would like to add about the County Welfare Board and how it makes decisions? 
What do you think the future role of the Community Action Agencies will be in 
all the changes that are coming about? 
Thank you for taking so much time for this interview. We greatly appreciate your 
contribution to this effort. If you would like a summary of the results of this study, 
please be sure you give me your name and address and I will send you a copy of the 
results. Thank you. 
Prepared by Esther Wattenberg for SW8-305, May 1981. 
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